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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The above court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to 
set aside a default and default judgment where the court had 
previously ordered that Defendant's pleadings be stricken for 
being handwritten, and ordered that the Defendant file an 
appropriate responsive pleading within ten days; and where the 
Defendant, having notice of the requirement that he file an 
appropriate answer, failed to do so. 
II. Was the Defendant entitled to prior notice of the entry 
of default and default judgment, other than service of the 
proposed order striking his pleadings and ordering him to file an 
appropriate responsive pleading within ten days. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Mistakes; inadvertence? excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; 
3 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action. 
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Notice to party in default. After the entry of the 
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of 
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it 
is necessary to conduct a hearing with regard to the cimount 
of damages of the nondefaulting party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant appeals from the order of the First Circuit 
Court denying his motion to set aside default and default 
judgment. 
A transcript of the hearing on Defendant's motion to set 
aside the default and default judgment has been obtained and 
references to that transcript shall be made by the page and line 
number of that transcript. All other facts are based upon the 
record, ie. the pleadings, papers, etc., which are contained in 
the court file. 
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Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a complaint seeking damages for 
unpaid services arising out representation of Defendant in a civil 
action. Upon being served, the Defendant filed a handwritten 
answer and subsequently a handwritten counterclaim. Following 
this the Defendant filed a handwritten motion to amend his 
counterclaim and for summary judgment and a handwritten points and 
authorities. The basis for the amendment to the counterclaim was 
that the process server who served the summons and complaint was a 
female who had to serve the Defendant in his bedroom due his 
physical condition. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to strike 
Defendant's handwritten pleadings upon the grounds that the carbon 
copies which were being sent to Plaintiff were illegible (T-Pg.3-
L.24). A hearing was scheduled and notice was sent to the 
Defendant. Defendant did not attend the hearing. At the hearing 
the court granted Plaintifffs motion. Plaintiff prepared a 
proposed order, submitted the original to the court and sent a 
copy to the Defendant by mail. The court then directed Plaintiff 
to amend the order to include that Defendant have ten days to file 
the appropriate responsive pleading and that if he failed to do 
so, default and default judgment would be entered (T-Pg.4-L.7). 
This order was signed by the court on December 3, 1987. Defendant 
filed a typed crossclaim and motion for summary judgment on 
November 2, 1987. Plaintiff objected to this motion upon the 
grounds that the Defendant had not yet filed an appropriate 
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answer, among other reasons. The court scheduled a hearing and 
sent notice to the parties. Defendant again failed to attend this 
hearing and the court denied Defendants motion. Plaintiff 
prepared a proposed order denying summary judgment and again sent 
a copy to the Defendant by mail. This order was signed on 
December 7, 1987. On December 22, 1987 Judge Daines signed the 
default judgment, awarding Plaintiff the amounts prayed for in the 
complaint. Defendant who thereafter obtained counsel, filed a 
motion to set aside the default and default judgment. This matter 
came on for hearing on April 27, 1988. Defendant did not appear, 
but his counsel was present. The court denied the motion and this 
appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in 
determining whether or not to vacate a default judgment. The 
decision not to grant this relief will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the trial court has abused its discretion. The Defendant 
has the burden of proving that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default 
judgment. Not only has the Defendant not shown any abuse of 
discretion, but none exists. The Defendant was served with a copy 
of the court's order directing him to file an appropriate 
responsive pleading within ten days. The Defendant was clearly 
aware of this order, but instead chose to file a motion for 
6 
summary judgment which he then failed to prosecute. The court was 
correct in holding that there was no excusable neglect on the part 
of the Defendant which would justify setting aside the default 
judgment. 
The Defendant was not entitled to receive notice that the 
court was going to enter default, other than the notice he did 
receive in the form of the order striking his pleadings and 
ordering him to file a responsive pleading within ten days. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1^ 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
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the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action. 
In Heath v^ Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah, 1976) the court at 
page 858 stated that: 
Whether a trial court should set aside a default 
judgment is largely a discretionary matter, and we will 
reverse a court's ruling only if it is clear that the court 
abused that discretion. 
See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 
(1953); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429 (1973); and Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (Utah, 1984). 
The Defendant in his brief does not demonstrate how the court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside default 
judgment; and furthermore the record itself does not reveal that 
the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to do 
so. The basis for entering a default judgment was a previous 
order of the court striking Defendant's pleadings upon the grounds 
that they were handwritten and that the Defendant was sending 
carbon copies to the Plaintiff which were illegible (T.-Pg.3-
L.24). The motion to strike was heard on October 21, 1987. A 
proposed order was submitted to the court on October 22, 1987. 
That same day a copy of that order was served on Defendant by 
mailing it to him. Subsequently, the court instructed Plaintiff 
to amend the order to allow the Defendant ten days to file an 
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appropriate responsive pleading before default judgment would be 
entered (T.-Pg.4-L.7). This order was submitted to the court on 
November 3, 1987. Again a copy was served on the Defendant by 
mail. On November 2, 1987 the Defendant filed a typed pleading 
entitled cross complaint, motion for summary judgment. On 
November 12, 1987, after receiving the amended order striking 
pleadings, the Defendant filed a pleading entitled points and 
authorities. In this pleading the Defendant states: 
A motion for summary judgment may be made by the 
defendant with or before (emphasis added) the filing of his 
answer. 
It is clear from this pleading that the Defendant was aware of the 
court's order to file an appropriate answer; and that the 
Defendant was electing not to do so, but rather to file a motion 
for summary judgment. The Defendant failed to prosecute this 
motion by filing any affidavits in support thereof, or to even 
attend the hearing set by the court. Following this hearing on 
November 25, 1987 an order was prepared and submitted to the 
court, and a copy was served on the Defendant. This order was 
signed on December 7, 1987. The default and default judgment were 
submitted to the court on December 4, 1987 and the default was 
entered on December 18, 1987 and the default judgment signed on 
December 22, 1987. The court in its order of May 11, 1988 found 
that there was no excusable neglect on the part of Defendant which 
would justify setting aside the default judgment. This finding is 
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amply supported by the record. The Defendant chose not to file an 
answer knowing that the court had ordered him to do so or default 
would enter. The Defendant was actually given more than the ten 
days set forth in the order to do so; but again, he chose to file 
a motion for summary judgment instead. A motion which he then 
failed to prosecute. 
Counsel for the Defendant argued in the motion to set aside 
default judgment that the Defendant, while representing himself, 
was naive of the legal process; and that the Defendant would be 
represented by counsel from then on. In J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc., 
v. Naef, 604 P. 2d 486 (Utah, 1979) the court, under a somewhat 
similar situation, held that the fact the defendant may have been 
naive as to the legal process did not justify setting aside the 
default judgment when it was apparent that the defendant was aware 
of the requirement of filing an answer. The fact that the 
Defendant was represented by counsel did not change the 
Defendant's conduct. The Defendant continued to file pro se 
pleadings even after his counsel had entered his appearance. The 
fact of the matter is that the record in the trial court and even 
the record in the Court of Appeals indicate that the Defendant has 
always done things his way no matter what the law required him to 
do. 
The Defendant also argues on appeal that the court should not 
have entered his default in as much as the pleadings which he had 
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filed should have been sufficient to place the matter at issue• 
Not only is this inconsistent with the order of the court that the 
Defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading; but it is not a 
sufficient reason to set aside the default judgment* The court in 
Katz v^ Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah, 1986) at page 93 stated: 
That some basis may exist to set aside the default 
does not require the conclusion that the court abused its 
discretion in refusing to do so when the facts and 
circumstances support refusal. 
In this case the court had clearly determined that the Defendant's 
pleadings were not acceptable. The court ordered that the 
Defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading; and the 
Defendant, being aware of this requirement, determined not to do 
so, but rather to file a motion for summary judgment which he then 
failed to prosecute. Clearly these facts and circumstances 
support the court's refusal to vacate the default judgment. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S INTENTION TO 
ENTER DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT IF A RESPONSIVE PLEADING WAS 
NOT FILED. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ANY FURTHER 
NOTICE UNTIL AFTER JUDGMENT HAD BEEN ENTERED. 
The Defendant argues that he should have received notice 
prior to the time that the court entered default and default 
judgment. The record clearly shows that the Defendant was served 
with a copy of the order striking his pleadings and giving him ten 
days within which to file an appropriate answer or default would 
be entered. This is all of the notice to which the Defendant was 
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entitled. There is no requirement under Utah law that a defendant 
receive some special three day notice before a default is entered. 
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Notice to party in default. After the entry of the 
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of 
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it 
is necessary to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount 
of damages of the nondefaulting party. 
Rule 58A(d) requires only that once a judgment has been entered, 
notice thereof be sent to the defendant. The Defendant did 
receive notice of judgment. Defendant's notion that he is somehow 
entitled to three day advance notice is apparently based upon the 
law in another jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has failed to demonstrate and the record does 
not reflect that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in 
refusing to set aside a default judgment. On the contrary the 
record reveals ample evidence to sustain the decision of the trial 
court. The Defendant elected not to file an answer when he knew 
that it was required. Instead he filed a motion for summary 
judgment which was denied when the Defendant failed to prosecute 
it. The Defendant received all of the notice to which he was 
entitled under Utah law. The decision of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
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DATED this / ^ A day of December, 1988. 
COZ 
Michael L. Miller 
Plaintiff / Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing 
on the Defendant by mailing them postage prepaid to: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West First North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
DATED this /£&• day of December, 1988. 
/tS/ , 
Carol M. Christensen 
ADDENDUM 
Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
Order Striking Defendant's Pleadings 
Second Order Striking Defendant's Pleadings 
Default and Default Judgment 
Defendant's Points and Authorities 
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1)723-1784 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87 CV 60 
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on for hearing 
before the above-entitled court on the 4th day of May 1988; and 
the Plaintiff having been present in person and Defendant not 
having been present in person, but represented by counsel; and the 
court having heard the argument of both parties; and having 
reviewed the pleadings on file in this matter; and having found 
that there was no excusable neglect on the part of Defendant which 
would justify setting aside default and default judgment; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's motion to set aside default and default judgment be 
denied• 
DATED th is // day of May, 1988. 
^^A^y^^ 
Robert W. Daines-Circuit Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing to the attorney for Defendant, postage prepaid, at: 
JD. Aron Stanton 
Attorney at Lav/ 
aeu.Miller 2 5 5 East 400 South, Suite 101 
neyauaw Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
. Main 11 
Box 399 
lam City, Ut. 11 
DATED this S ~ ^ day of May, 1988. 
2 
ae l L. Mi l ler 
ney at Law 
. Main 
Box 399 
am City Ut 
> 
723-1784 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S 
PLEADINGS 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 87 CV 60 
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for 
hearing on the 21st day of October, 1987 before the above-entitled 
court, the Honorable Robert W. Daines presiding; and the Plaintiff 
having been present and the Defendant not having been present; and 
the court having reviewed the court file in this matter and heard 
the argument of Plaintiff; and being fully advised in the 
premises; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's pleadings 
previously filed in this matter are hereby striken. No further 
pleadings or papers from the Defendant which do not conform to 
Rule 2.3, Utah Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts, 
shall be accepted. 
DATED this .day of ., 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
ROBERT W. DAINES - CIRCUIT JUDGE 
iael L. Miller 
rney at Law 
> Main 
Box 399 
lam City Ut 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing to the Defendant, postage prepaid, at: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 100 North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
DATED this 2AAJL day of October, 1987. 
Michael L. Miller 
iael L. Miller 
mey at Law 
D. Mam 
Box 399 
•»am City, Ut. 
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I 723-1784 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S 
PLEADINGS 
Civil No. 87 CV 60 
BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly for 
hearing on the 21st day of October, 1987 before the above-entitled 
court, the Honroable Robert W. Daines presiding; and the Plaintiff 
having been present and the Defendant not having been present; and 
the court having reviewed the court file in this matter and heard 
the argument of Plaintiff; and being fully advised in the 
premises; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's pleadings 
previously filed in this matter are hereby stricken. No further 
pleadings or papers from the Defendant which do not conform to 
Rule 2.3, Utah Rules of Practice for District and Circuit Courts, 
shall be accepted. Defendant shall have ten (10) days from the 
date of this order within which to file the appropriate responsive 
pleadings, and failing to do so, default and default judgment may 
be entered. 
DATED t h i s _day of November, 1987, 
BY THE COURT: 
Kiel L. Mil ler 
rney at Law 
>. Main 
Box 399 
lam City, Ut. 
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723-1784 ROBERT W. DAINES - CIRCUIT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing to the Defendant, postage prepaid, at: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 100 North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1987. 
fichael L. Miller 
ael I . Mi l ler 
ley at Law 
Main 
3ox399 
am Oty, Ut 
723 1784 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87 CV 60 
BE IT KNOWN that in this matter the defendant having been 
personally served with a summons and complaint; and thereafter 
having filed an answer; and plaintiff having moved to strike said 
answer; and the court having granted said motion and ordered that 
defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading within ten days; 
and defendant having failed to file such a responsive pleading; 
now 
WHEREFORE the default of defendant is hereby entered as a 
matter of law. 
DATED this _day of December, 1987. 
By the Clerk of the Court: 
Deputy Clerk 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
BE IT KNOWN that in this matter the defendant having been 
personally served with a summons and complaint; and thereafter 
ael L. Mil ler 
ney at Law 
. Main 
Box 399 
am City. Ut. 
) 
723 1784 
having filed an answer; and plaintiff having moved to strike said 
answer; and the court having granted said motion and ordered that 
defendant file an appropriate responsive pleading within ten days; 
and defendant having failed to file such a responsive pleading; 
and the default of defendant having been entered as a matter of 
law; now 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff be and is 
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant as follows: 
$1,168.75 in principal, 
>54.47 in interest accrued to the date of judgment, 
$22.00 in costs accrued to the date of judgment, 
$1,345.22 total judgment, together with interest thereon at 
the rate of 18% per annum until collected and any costs of the 
court which accrue hereafter. 
DATED this .r^P clay of December, 1987. 
By the Court: 
obfert W. Daines - Judge 
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Wl \l 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 1st North 
Brigham City, Utah 
Tel. 801 723-3677 
In Propria Persona 
84302 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH 
FOR BOX ELDER .COUNTY 
Civil No. 87-60 
Points and Authorities 
November 25, 1987 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, 
Plaintiff and Cross-defendant, 
vs. 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Cross-Complainant. 
A motion for summary judgment may be made by defendant with or before 
(emphasis added) the filing of his answer. Gifford vs. Travelerfs 
Protective Assn. (1946) 153 F.2d 209. 
If this motion is denied, defendant incorporates by reference the fee 
arbitration committee's decision on file herein as his answer. This decision 
is relevant as it indicates Mr. Miller!s action is meritless. 
Jfly'.Si.^s. ^ ,CL4^^yr— Dated Nov. 5, 1987 
Gordon £. Johnson 
Proof of Service 
I hereby certify that on the following date I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing to Michael L. Miller, 20 South Main St., Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Dated Nov. 9, 1987 at Denver, Colorado 
